Interactions between the neural correlates of dispositional internally directed thought and visual imagery : Internal thought and visual imagery

Cognition is not always directed to the events in the here and now and we often self-generate thoughts and images in imagination. Important aspects of these self-generated experiences are associated with various dispositional traits. In this study, we explored whether these psychological associations relate to a common underlying neurocognitive mechanism. We acquired resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging data from a large cohort of participants and asked them to retrospectively report their experience during the scan. Participants also completed questionnaires reflecting a range of dispositional traits. We found thoughts emphasizing visual imagery at rest were associated with dispositional tendency towards internally directed attention (self-consciousness and attentional problems) and linked to a stronger correlation between a posterior parietal network and a lateral frontooral network. Furthermore, decoupling between the brainstem and a lateral visual network was associated with dispositional internally directed attention. Critically, these brain-cognition associations were related: The correlation between parietal-frontal regions and reports of visual imagery was stronger for individuals with increased connectivity between brainstem and visual cortex. Our results highlight neural mechanisms linked to the dispositional basis for patterns of self-generated thought, and suggest that accounting for dispositional traits is important when exploring the neural substrates of self-generated experience (and vice versa). This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: Voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'

Illuminating the dark matter of social neuroscience: Considering the problem of social interaction from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives

Successful human social interaction depends on our capacity to understand other people's mental states and to anticipate how they will react to our actions. Despite its importance to the human condition, the exact mechanisms underlying our ability to understand another's actions, feelings, and thoughts are still a matter of conjecture. Here, we consider this problem from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives. In a critical review, we demonstrate that attempts to draw parallels across these complementary disciplines is premature: The second-person perspective does not map directly to Interaction or Simulation theories, online social cognition, or shared neural network accounts underlying action observation or empathy. Nor does the third-person perspective map onto Theory-Theory (TT), offline social cognition, or the neural networks that support Theory of Mind (ToM). Moreover, we argue that important qualities of social interaction emerge through the reciprocal interplay of two independent agents whose unpredictable behavior requires that models of their partner's internal state be continually updated. This analysis draws attention to the need for paradigms in social neuroscience that allow two individuals to interact in a spontaneous and natural manner and to adapt their behavior and cognitions in a response contingent fashion due to the inherent unpredictability in another person's behavior. Even if such paradigms were implemented, it is possible that the specific neural correlates supporting such reciprocal interaction would not reflect computation unique to social interaction but rather the use of basic cognitive and emotional processes combined in a unique manner. Finally, we argue that given the crucial role of social interaction in human evolution, ontogeny, and every-day social life, a more theoretically and methodologically nuanced approach to the study of real social interaction will nevertheless help the field of social cognition to evolve

Tracking thoughts: : Exploring the neural architecture of mental time travel during mind-wandering

The capacity to imagine situations that have already happened or fictitious events that may take place in the future is known as mental time travel (MTT). Studies have shown that MTT is an important aspect of spontaneous thought, yet we lack a clear understanding of how the neurocognitive architecture of the brain constrains this element of human cognition. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies have shown that MTT involves the coordination between multiple regions that include mesiotemporal structures such as the hippocampus, as well as prefrontal and parietal regions commonly associated with the default mode network (DMN). The current study used a multimodal neuroimaging approach to identify the structural and functional brain organisation that underlies individual differences in the capacity to spontaneously engage in MTT. Using regionally unconstrained diffusion tractography analysis, we found increased diffusion anisotropy in right lateralised temporo-limbic, corticospinal, inferior fronto-occipital tracts in participants who reported greater MTT. Probabilistic connectivity mapping revealed a significantly higher connection probability of the right hippocampus with these tracts. Resting-state functional MRI connectivity analysis using the right hippocampus as a seed region revealed greater functional coupling to the anterior regions of the DMN with increasing levels of MTT. These findings demonstrate that the interactions between the hippocampus and regions of the cortex underlie the capacity to engage in MTT, and support contemporary theoretical accounts that suggest that the integration of the hippocampus with the DMN provides the neurocognitive landscape that allows us to imagine distant times and places

That's me in the spotlight - Neural basis of individual differences in self-consciousness

A long-standing literature implicates activity within the default mode network (DMN) to processes linked to the self. However, contemporary work suggests that other large-scale networks networks might also be involved. For instance, goal-directed autobiographical planning requires positive functional connectivity (FC) between DMN and frontoparietal control (FPCN) networks. The present study examined the inter-relationship between trait self-focus (measured via a self-consciousness scale; SCS), incidental memory in a self-reference paradigm, and resting state FC of large-scale networks. Behaviourally, we found that private SCS was linked to stronger incidental memory for self-relevant information. We also examined how patterns of FC differed according to levels of self-consciousness by using the SCS data to drive multiple regression analyses with seeds from the DMN, the FPCN and the limbic network. High levels of SCS was not linked to differences in the functional behaviour of the DMN, however, it was linked to stronger FC between FPCN and a cluster extending into the hippocampus, which meta analytic decoding using Neurosynth linked to episodic memory retrieval. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that trait variance in this pattern of FC was a moderator for the observed relationship between private SCS and enhanced memory for self-items. Together these findings suggest that interactions between the FPCN and hippocampus may support the memory advantage of self-relevant information associated with SCS and confirm theoretical positions that argue that that self-related processing does not simply depend upon the DMN, but instead relies on complex patterns of interactions between multiple large-scale networks

The era of the wandering mind? Twenty-first century research on self-generated mental activity

The first decade of the twenty-first century was characterized by renewed scientific interest in self-generated mental activity (activity largely generated by the individual, rather than in direct response to experimenters’ instructions or specific external sensory inputs). To understand this renewal of interest, we interrogated the peer-reviewed literature from 2003 to 2012 (i) to explore recent changes in use of terms for self-generated mental activity; (ii) to investigate changes in the topics on which mind wandering research, specifically, focuses; and (iii) to visualize co-citation communities amongst researchers working on self-generated mental activity. Our analyses demonstrated that there has been a dramatic increase in the term “mind wandering” from 2006, and a significant crossing-over of psychological investigations of mind wandering into cognitive neuroscience (particularly in relation to research on the default mode and default mode network). If our article concludes that this might, indeed, be the “era of the wandering mind,” it also calls for more explicit reflection to be given by researchers in this field to the terms they use, the topics and brain regions they focus on, and the research literatures that they implicitly foreground or ignore

How do we decide what to do? Resting-state connectivity patterns and components of self-generated thought linked to the development of more concrete personal goals

Human cognition is not limited to the available environmental input but can consider realities that are different to the here and now. We describe the cognitive states and neural processes linked to the refinement of descriptions of personal goals. When personal goals became concrete, participants reported greater thoughts about the self and the future during mind-wandering. This pattern was not observed for descriptions of TV programmes. Connectivity analysis of participants who underwent a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging scan revealed neural traits associated with this pattern. Strong hippocampal connectivity with ventromedial pre-frontal cortex was common to better-specified descriptions of goals and TV programmes, while connectivity between hippocampus and the pre-supplementary motor area was associated with individuals whose goals were initially abstract but became more concrete over the course of the experiment. We conclude that self-generated cognition that arises during the mind-wandering state can allow goals to be refined, and this depends on neural systems anchored in the hippocampus

Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism

Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street's 'Darwinian dilemma' argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street's scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with evolutionary views of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her Adaptive Link Account (ALA) of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend an evolutionary byproduct perspective on evaluative judgment. I then argue that a consideration of levels of analysis in biological-behavioral explanation suggests that the realist who adopts the byproduct perspective I outline is not at a prima facie disadvantage to the normative anti-realist on grounds of parsimony. This perspective, I suggest, can enable normative realists to answer evolutionary challenges to their view

Daydreaming to navigate the social world: What we know, what we don't know, and why it matters

A substantial portion of daily life is spent daydreaming—that is, engaged in thought independent of, and unrelated to, goals in the external environment. We argue that this naturally occurring, unconstrained cognition is a vital, but currently underappreciated, form of social cognition that enables navigation of the social world. First, we present the results of a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies which illustrate the shared neural basis of daydreaming and social cognition (including regions of the anterior temporal lobes and the posterior cingulate cortex). Second, we review evidence regarding the frequency, correlates, and adaptive outcomes of social daydreaming, cumulative findings that point to the adaptive value of imaging others during this offline state. We end by encouraging cross-fertilization between daydreaming research and domains of social psychology (goal pursuit, social interactions, and close relationships), which we hope will foster mutually beneficial directions for understanding the role that unconstrained thinking plays in social life

Brain networks underlying bistable perception

Bistable stimuli, such as the Necker Cube, demonstrate that experience can change in the absence of changes in the environment. Such phenomena can be used to assess stimulus-independent aspects of conscious experience. The current study used resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) to index stimulus-independent changes in neural activity to understand the neural architecture that determines dominance durations during bistable perception (using binocular rivalry and Necker cube stimuli). Anterior regions of the Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) exhibited robust connectivity with regions of primary sensorimotor cortex. The strength of this region’s connectivity with the striatum predicted shorter dominance durations during binocular rivalry, whereas its connectivity to pre-motor cortex predicted longer dominance durations for the Necker Cube. Posterior regions of the SPL, on the other hand, were coupled to associative cortex in the temporal and frontal lobes. The posterior SPL’s connectivity to the temporal lobe predicted longer dominance during binocular rivalry. In conjunction with prior work, these data suggest that the anterior SPL contributes to perceptual rivalry through the inhibition of incongruent bottom up information, whereas the posterior SPL influences rivalry by supporting the current interpretation of a bistable stimulus. Our data suggests that the functional connectivity of the SPL with regions of sensory, motor and associative cortex allows it to regulate the interpretation of the environment that forms the focus of conscious attention at a specific moment in time